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(UN)INTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
Formal Controls, Neighborhood Disadvantage, and Violent Crime in U.S. Cities: 
Examining (Un)intended Consequences 
 
Purpose: This study examines the intended and unintended effects of formal social 
controls on violent crime within and across U.S. cities.  
Methods: Using data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study, we assess whether 
greater police arrest activity and jail incarceration risk are associated with lower violent 
crime rates across cities. We also investigate whether greater use of these formal social 
controls exacerbates the relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and 
violent crime.  
Results: Results from multilevel analyses show that some formal controls (jail 
incarceration risk) reduce violent crime across cities, but other formal controls (police 
arrest activity) amplify the relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and 
violent crime within cities.  
Conclusions: Two main conclusions can be drawn from our analyses. First, we found 
evidence that some formal controls do reduce violent crime, while others do not. Second, 
our results support scholars’ arguments that formal controls have unintended 
consequences (e.g., Clear, 2007, 2008; Rose & Clear, 1998), specifically, by amplifying 
the effect of extreme neighborhood disadvantage on violent crime. 
 
Keywords: formal social controls, neighborhood disadvantage, violent crime, community 
crime 
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 The regulation of crime in communities is a process that is owed to both informal and 
formal social controls (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Clear, 2007; Sampson, 1986). Researchers of 
community crime have focused primarily on the crime-reducing effects of informal social 
controls such as social ties, community organizations, collective efficacy, and so forth (e.g., 
Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997), with much less attention to the 
effects of formal social controls (e.g., police, jail incarceration) (Clear et al., 2003; Kubrin & 
Weitzer, 2003; Sampson & Loeffler, 2010; Wildeman & Western, 2010). Additionally, much of 
the research on formal controls has focused primarily on the consequences of state imprisonment 
(e.g., Levitt, 1996; Kovandzic & Vieraitis, 2006; Western, 2006) as opposed to the effects of 
more localized formal controls such as police and jails.1 Such formal controls may reduce city 
crime rates (Sampson, 1986); however, they may also impact the neighborhood processes (e.g., 
informal controls) that affect neighborhood crime rates within cities, thereby having unintended 
consequences, such as higher crime, in these areas (Clear, 2007; Rose & Clear, 1998). Further, 
because formal controls such as police and jail incarceration may be applied differently within 
and across cities (Klinger, 1997), their impacts on crime rates may be different for various types 
of communities, particularly disadvantaged ones (e.g., Clear, 2007; Rose & Clear, 1998). In this 
study, we assess the impact of formal controls (police arrest activity, jail incarceration risk) on 
rates of violent crime across U.S. cities, as well as whether these formal controls affect the 
relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantaged and violent crime within cities.  
Formal Controls in Communities 
As sources of social control, both formal and informal controls ultimately function to 
regulate behavior; however, some scholars have suggested that formal controls do not 
necessarily reduce crime in all cases, nor in all types of communities. Clear and his colleagues 
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(Clear, 2007; Rose & Clear, 1998) have offered the most precise theoretical expectations 
regarding the potential “unintended consequences” (e.g., higher crime, reduced capacity for 
informal social control) of formal controls for certain types of neighborhoods. The core argument 
put forth by Clear and colleagues has suggested that while formal controls are typically expected 
to reduce crime rates within communities (a direct effect), they may actually increase crime if 
they impede the capacity of communities to regulate crime themselves through the use of 
informal control (a moderating effect). Rose and Clear (1998) explained that coercive mobility, 
or the forced removal of neighborhood residents through the use of formal controls (such as 
arrest), may exacerbate the relationship between neighborhood disadvantage and crime because 
it disrupts the ability of the informal social controls (e.g., social ties between residents, family 
supervision) in these areas to work properly. In other words, relying too heavily on the police or 
incarceration to reduce crime may undermine the ability of informal controls, such as families, to 
control crime (Clear et al., 2003; Frost & Gross, 2012; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Rose & Clear, 
1998). Further, this effect is expected to be most pronounced in areas characterized by extreme 
levels of disadvantage, primarily because the informal controls that are available in such areas 
are already depleted and/or strained (Clear, 2008; Clear et al., 2003).  
A few studies have examined Clear’s expectations empirically (Clear, Rose, & Ryder, 
2001; Clear et al., 2003; Lynch & Sabol, 2004a, 2004b; Lynch et al., 2002; Sabol & Lynch, 
2003), but these studies have: 1) primarily focused on imprisonment as a formal control--not 
police or jails; 2) used data from only a few cities; and, 3) not focused on the impact of formal 
controls within extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods in particular. In the current study, we 
attempt to fill these gaps by examining the direct effects of city formal controls, as measured by 
police arrest activity and jail incarceration, on violent crime rates across 90 cities in the U.S., as 
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well as the moderating effects of formal controls on the relationship between extreme 
disadvantage and crime within cities. We assess whether formal controls have intended 
consequences for cities (e.g., lower crime rates), but unintended consequences for some 
neighborhoods (e.g., extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods) within those cities.  
Intended and Unintended Consequences of Formal Controls 
Direct Effects of Formal Controls on City Crime Rates 
Formal controls are expected to directly reduce crime levels, primarily by deterring crime 
or incapacitating offenders from committing future crimes. Wilson and Kelling (1982), for 
instance, argued that increased police attention to “minor” offenses, such as public intoxication, 
littering, and so forth might be associated with lower violent crime rates because it sends a 
message to potential offenders that crime – even minor forms – will not be tolerated.2 Stark 
(1987) observed that more rigorous law enforcement decreased crime and deviance, and 
suggested that lenient law enforcement practices may unintentionally attract criminals. Wilson 
and Kelling (1982) also posited that less vigorous policing increases disorder and sends the 
message that “no one cares” about the area. Increased police arrest activity, then, may impact 
crime rates because offenders perceive that there is a high likelihood they will be detected and 
punished for criminal behavior (Sampson, 1986; Wilson & Boland, 1978) or because law 
enforcement is viewed to be more “proactive” (Kubrin et al., 2010).  
Evidence from studies conducted at both the city- and neighborhood-levels of analysis 
indicates that more stringent policing practices are, in fact, associated with lower rates of crime 
and violence (e.g., Kane, 2006; Kubrin et al., 2010; Sampson & Cohen, 1988; Wilson & Boland, 
1978; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). However, Kubrin and colleagues (2010) noted that prior studies 
of proactive or aggressive policing may have suffered from underspecification in their empirical 
models, particularly by failing to acknowledging that police behavior is impacted by macro-level 
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factors such as the social and economic health of a city. Klinger (1997) has theorized that police 
actions are influenced by environmental factors, and scholars have found that racial (e.g., Kane, 
2003; Smith, 1986) and socioeconomic (e.g., Sun, Payne, & Wu, 2008; Smith, 1986; Terrill & 
Reisig, 2003) characteristics influence police actions, with police potentially being more active 
in areas with increased racial heterogeneity or lower socioeconomic status. Thus, certain areas of 
a city may experience more proactive police tactics than others, but the extent to which police 
behaviors impact various communities differently remains to be determined. 
In addition to the police, incarceration may also reduce criminal activity by removing and 
incapacitating offenders from a city, at least temporarily suspending their criminal activity.3 
Extant studies have examined the effects of incarceration at the state and national level, with the 
majority of research concluding that large increases in prison populations lead to only slight 
reductions in crime rates, or are not associated with crime levels at all (DeFina & Arvanites, 
2002; Johnson & Raphael, 2012; Lynch & Sabol, 2004a; Marvell, 2010; Marvell & Moody, 
1994; Spelman, 2000; Visher, 1987; Zimring & Hawkins, 1988). Perhaps this is because not all 
offenders have the same risk of being arrested and incarcerated (Visher, 1987), or, because 
incarceration at the city level is more relevant and meaningful (e.g., better signifies the 
likelihood of punishment) to potential offenders than incapacitation at the state or national level 
(Sampson, 1986). Indeed, contrary to evidence on state and national incarceration, Sampson 
(1986) found that a higher risk of jail incarceration reduced rates of robbery across cities. Very 
little research has examined the effects of jail incarceration on city crime rates; however, 
scholars have suggested that incarceration is differentially concentrated throughout areas within 
cities, with disadvantaged neighborhoods being particularly likely to experience higher rates of 
incarceration (Sampson & Loeffler, 2010; Western, 2007; Wildeman & Western, 2010). In this 
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study, we examine the impact of police arrest activity and jail incarceration on city crime rates 
while controlling for important city and neighborhood covariates.   
Moderating Effects of Formal Controls on the Relationship Between Extreme Disadvantage and 
Neighborhood Crime Rates 
Clear and colleagues (Clear, 2007; Rose & Clear, 1998) have provided theoretical 
expectations regarding the potential moderating effects of formal controls on neighborhood-level 
processes, but the empirical validity of these expectations warrants continued investigation (for 
exceptions see Clear, Rose, & Ryder, 2001; Clear et al., 2003; Lynch & Sabol, 2004a, 2004b; 
Lynch et al., 2002; Sabol & Lynch, 2003). Clear has argued that over-reliance on, or over-use of, 
formal controls (e.g., policing, incarceration) can undermine the effectiveness of informal social 
control agents to regulate crime within disadvantaged neighborhoods, which in turn, may lead to 
increased levels of crime; further, these moderating effects may be most pronounced in areas that 
are characterized by extreme disadvantage because the sources of informal social control may 
already be limited, strained, or depleted in these areas (Clear et al., 2003; Rose & Clear, 1998; 
Shaw & McKay, 1942). In partial support of this idea, Clear et al. (2003) found that higher rates 
of admissions and releases from prisons within Tallahassee neighborhoods were associated with 
higher rates of neighborhood crime. Following Clear and colleagues (Clear, 2007, 2008; Rose & 
Clear, 1998), we expect that greater use of formal controls may unintentionally exacerbate the 
relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and violent crime by reducing the 
number and/or effectiveness of informal social control agents in these areas. While we do not 
examine these intervening processes directly, we recognize the theoretical mechanisms which we 
believe to operate when formal controls are vigorously employed in extremely disadvantaged 
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neighborhoods. That is, these linkages explain why the effects of neighborhood disadvantage on 
crime rates may be exacerbated in cities with greater use of formal controls.  
Regarding the number of informal social control agents within disadvantaged 
neighborhoods, the social costs of arrests and incarceration can be detrimental to local human 
ecology systems, as incapacitation (both temporarily and long-term) removes individuals from 
neighborhoods which could otherwise benefit from their presence (Clear, 2007). For example, 
when a father is arrested and/or incarcerated, the household becomes headed by a single parent, a 
potential income-earner is removed, and the amount of supervision over children is reduced 
(Clear, 2008; Parker & Reckdenwald, 2008; Sabol & Lynch, 2003; Western, 2007; Western, 
Lopoo, & McLanahan, 2004). Removal of such an individual may have a broader impact within 
a neighborhood as well, since social ties between neighbors and the individual are disrupted and 
a potential income-generating member of the neighborhood is removed, creating increased strain 
on community resources (Clear, 2007; Fagan, 1997; Frost & Gross, 2012; Western, 2007).4  
The overuse use of formal controls within disadvantaged neighborhoods may also reduce 
informal social control agents’ effectiveness and capacity for crime control. For instance, when 
social ties within families and between neighborhood residents are disrupted (Western, Lopoo, & 
McLanahan, 2004), levels of cohesion, communication, and commitment–both to the area and 
among the residents within the area (Lynch & Sabol, 2004a)–may become strained and/or 
depleted (Clear, 2007). This can lead to a diminished sense of “community” in which 
neighborhood residents know each other, communicate, and work toward nurturing the health of 
the community (Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson et al., 1997; Ross, Mirowsky, & Pribesh, 2002; 
Warner, 2014).  
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Residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods may also become cynical about the legitimacy 
of criminal justice agencies, such as the police or correctional institutions (Kirk & Matsuda, 
2011; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). Residents may come to perceive 
that their community is being unfairly targeted for criminal justice sanctioning (e.g., Clear, 2007; 
Kane, 2005; Weitzer, 1999; Walker, 1992), or their trust in the criminal justice system could be 
eroded by personal or anecdotal experiences (Brunson, 2007; Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 
2007). Both scenarios could weaken mainstream belief systems regarding the importance of, and 
capacity for, criminal justice agencies to control crime within their neighborhood (e.g., Berg et 
al., 2012). If cynicism regarding the law and its agents becomes pervasive across neighborhood 
residents, then residents may adapt to this cultural circumstance by becoming more self-reliant, 
which could weaken residents’ capability to come together to resolve problems and informally 
control crime (Sampson et al., 1997; Kornhauser, 1978), only furthering the need for additional 
criminal justice system involvement. 
Finally, the burden that the social systems endure as a result of formal control actions 
may prove to be too much to handle, and this effect may be most detrimental in extremely 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. This is because the adverse effects of formal controls may be 
more devastating in disadvantaged areas compared to more affluent areas because residents in 
these areas have fewer resources to begin with (e.g., social and human capital, economic vitality, 
strong social ties; see Kornhauser, 1978; Rose & Clear, 1998; Wilson, 1987). Therefore, 
extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods may experience unintended consequences brought on 
by formal controls because the lack of resources in such communities would be further depleted, 
and in some cases, these resources would be completely exhausted (Clear et al., 2003). We are 
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not aware of studies that have examined whether formal controls amplify the effect of 
neighborhood disadvantage on crimes rates, as the theory described above would suggest.  
To summarize, more research is needed regarding the intended and unintended effects of 
formal controls, such as police arrest activity and jail incarceration risk, on crime within 
communities. We know very little about the effects of formal controls (police and jail) on rates 
of crime across cities or neighborhood crime rates within cities. Further, much of what we know 
about the effects of formal controls on communities comes from data collected within select 
cities, despite calls for additional data collection efforts within other cities (e.g., Lynch & Sabol, 
2004b). Finally, and perhaps most relevant to the current study, assessment of the impact of 
formal controls in extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods is still needed. Building from 
research on formal controls, coercive mobility, and the collateral consequences of incarceration 
(e.g., Clear, 2008; Hipp, Petersilia, & Turner, 2010; Petersilia, 2003; Sampson, 2011; Western, 
2006; Wildeman & Western, 2010), we assess the direct and moderating impacts of formal 
controls on crime using a national sample of neighborhoods within large cities. We examine the 
main effects of formal controls (i.e., police arrest activity and jail incarceration risk) on city 
violent crime rates (e.g., robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide) and the moderating effects 
of these formal controls on the relationship between neighborhood disadvantage and crime.    
Method 
Sample and Data 
 
The multi-level dataset compiled for this study consists of structural and demographic 
characteristics of neighborhoods (defined as census tracts) across U.S. cities as well as 
information regarding local arrest, jail, and crime data. The National Neighborhood Crime Study 
(NNCS) 2000 (Peterson & Krivo, 2010) provided the foundation for the data set. The NNCS 
(UN)INTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
10 
 
involved a two stage sampling design with cities selected at stage one, followed by 
neighborhoods at stage two. The cities in the U.S. with a population greater than 100,000 (as of 
1999) were stratified by census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), and then cities 
were randomly selected from each strata, resulting in 91 cities. Next, all of the populated census 
tracts within those cities were selected; creating a final sample of 9,593 census tracts (hereafter 
referred to as neighborhoods) nested within 91 large U.S. cities.5  
For the NNCS, sociodemographic information was collected for each neighborhood 
along with neighborhood-level crime data. For purposes of this study, we combined the NNCS 
data with information collected from several other data sources described below. The current 
analysis consists of 9,560 tracts nested within 90 cities. One city (Topeka, KS) was unable to 
provide arrest data due to a change in their computer operating systems and had to be dropped 
from the sample. For some of the analyses reported here, the sample was also restricted to a 
smaller number of cities, due to availability of neighborhood-level crime data in the NNCS.6  For 
the analysis of robbery, 9,560 census tracts located within 90 cities were examined, 8,580 census 
tracts within 78 cities were examined for the analysis of aggravated assault, and 8,979 census 
tracts within 88 cities were examined for the analysis of homicide. Despite the missing data for 
some neighborhoods and cities, the sample of NNCS cities generalizes to most large urban 
places regarding crime levels, racial/ethnic composition, segregation, and economic disadvantage 
(Krivo et al., 2009; Peterson & Krivo 2010). 
Measures  
All of the measures used in the analyses are described in table 1. The outcome measures 
included different types of violent crime (robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide).7 The 
neighborhood totals for these offenses were averaged over a three year period (1999-2001) in 
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order to reduce the impact of annual fluctuations and provide a more reliable measures for small 
areas (see also Messner & Golden, 1992; Peterson, Krivo, & Harris, 2000; Sampson, 1987). 
Robbery represents the natural log of the three-year average reported rate of robberies per 1,000 
persons. Aggravated assault is the natural log of the three-year average reported rate of 
aggravated assaults per 1,000 persons. Homicide is the three-year sum of the number of murders 
and non-negligent manslaughters within each neighborhood. The natural log of the rates of 
robbery and aggravated assault were taken because the original distributions were skewed. 
Homicide was measured as a limited count rather than a rate (see also Browning, Feinberg, & 
Dietz, 2004; Browning et al., 2010).  
-- Table 1 about here -- 
The predictor variables included both neighborhood- and city-level measures. For the 
neighborhood-level measures, we followed prior research (e.g., Browning, Leventhal, & Brooks-
Gunn, 2005; Land et al., 1990) and conducted a principle components analysis of nine census 
indicators, which revealed a three component solution that explained 88 percent of the variation 
in these items (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .806). The three 
components reflect the structural characteristics of neighborhoods, concentrated disadvantage, 
concentrated immigration, and residential instability (e.g., Sampson et al., 1997). Based on the 
component loadings, neighborhood disadvantage was comprised of five items (Eigenvalue = 
4.41): percent of civilian working age population unemployed; percent female-headed 
households; percent of population receiving public assistance; percent of population who did not 
graduate high school; percent of population living in poverty.8 Extreme neighborhood 
disadvantage is a dichotomous measure reflecting the top 10 percent of disadvantaged 
neighborhoods within each city based on the neighborhood disadvantage scale (Krivo & 
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Peterson, 1996). Following Clear (2008), moderating effects of formal controls were only 
expected in neighborhoods where levels of informal social control are already depleted or 
strained, and so the measure of extreme neighborhood disadvantage was created for the analysis 
of moderating effects. Concentrated immigration (Eigenvalue = 2.49) consisted of three items: 
the percent of population Hispanic, percent of population foreign born, and percent of population 
linguistically isolated. Residential instability (Eigenvalue = 1.00) consisted of the percent of 
population age five and over who lived in a different residence in 1995.  
Because formal controls may be exercised differentially across neighborhoods within 
cities, we controlled for other potential confounding effects of neighborhood composition (e.g., 
Kubrin et al., 2010; Stark, 1987). We included the percent of the population black (percent 
black) and the percent of the population Asian (percent Asian). Although the immigrant 
population in some cities is primarily Asian, preliminary analyses revealed that percent Asian did 
not correlate strongly with the items that comprise the concentrated immigration scale.     
City-level covariates included three measures of formal controls. Police arrest activity – 
minor offenses was measured as the number of arrests for driving under the influence (DUI) and 
disorderly conduct per police officer (see Sampson, 1986; Wilson & Boland, 1978). Police arrest 
activity – violent offenses was included as a second measure of police arrest activity; this 
measure was operationalized as the number of arrests for violent offenses per police officer (see 
Kane, 2006).9 Local arrest data for these offenses were obtained from Uniform Crime Reporting 
Program Data [United States]: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race, 2000.10 Jail incarceration risk 
represents the total county jail population per 100 county violent index offenses (see Sampson, 
1986). The jail data were obtained through the Annual Survey of Jails: Jurisdiction-Level Data, 
2000, which collects information on jails for the year preceding the survey data. Counties that 
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were not listed in the survey (n = 4) were collected directly from the county jails.11 Consistent 
with Sampson’s (1986) analysis, a few cities were located within the same county and received 
the same jail incarceration risk measure. 
Because city-level factors such as inequality and racial isolation may influence levels of 
formal controls and crime (Kubrin et al., 2010; Sampson & Wilson, 1995), we controlled for the 
Gini index of inequality for each city and a measure of Black isolation.12 We also considered 
other measures of racial/ethnic isolation (e.g., Hispanic isolation), but preliminary analyses 
revealed that they were not related to any of the outcome measures once the other covariates 
were include in the models, and so they were excluded from our final analyses.   
Analytic Strategy 
 
Due to the hierarchical structure of the data (neighborhoods nested within cities), 
multilevel modeling techniques were used.13 Hierarchical linear regression was used for the 
analysis of robbery and aggravated assault, while homicide was examined with hierarchical 
Poisson regression. The distribution of homicide was skewed so the correction for overdispersion 
available in the HLM 7.0 software was used. The logged value of the population for each tract 
was also included as an independent variable in the analysis of homicide, and the parameter 
associated with the logged value of tract population was fixed to one (Osgood, 2000).  
Unconditional models were estimated for each outcome. These models revealed 
significant variation in each crime outcome across the cities (p ≤ .05). The intra-class correlation 
coefficients indicated that 36 percent of the variation in robbery rates, 31 percent of the variation 
in aggravated assault rates, and 16 percent of the variation in homicide rates existed across cities 
compared to 64 percent (robbery), 69 percent (aggravated assault), and 84 percent (homicide) 
within cities. Next, we estimated random coefficient models in order to assess the effects of the 
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neighborhood-level variables on the outcomes, and determine whether the neighborhood effects 
varied across cities (p ≤ .05), which would suggest these effects were stronger in some cities 
versus others. Neighborhood-level effects that did not vary across cities were treated as fixed or 
having a common slope across cities. All of the level-1 variables were grand-mean centered in 
order to control for compositional differences in neighborhoods across cities. For the third step 
of the analysis, the city-level measures were entered permitting an examination of the main 
effects of formal controls on the level-1 intercepts (neighborhood crime rates).14 Lastly, 
intercepts and slopes as outcomes models were estimated in order to examine the effects of 
formal controls on the relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and violent 
crime rates.  
Results 
 
Before delving into the primary study findings, it is worth noting that the typical 
neighborhood included in this study was relatively safe in terms of violent crime. Over the three-
year period (1999-2001), the median robbery rate was 2.86 per 1,000 persons and the median 
aggravated assault rate was 4.36 per 1,000 persons. Also, most neighborhoods (49%) did not 
experience a homicide within the three-year period; the median number of homicides across 
these neighborhoods was one homicide.  
Table 2 contains the main effects of neighborhood characteristics and city-level formal 
controls on violent crime rates. The results in table 2 show that neighborhood disadvantage, 
residential instability, and percent black were associated with higher rates of violent crime within 
cities (robbery, aggravated assault, homicide). Concentrated immigration was associated with 
higher rates of robbery and homicide, but not aggravated assault. Neighborhoods with higher 
percentages of Asians had lower rates of all types of violent crime. The significant neighborhood 
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characteristics accounted for 46, 67, and 39 percent of the within city variation in robbery, 
aggravated assault, homicide, respectively.  
-- Table 2 about here -- 
Table 2 also shows that cities with a higher jail incarceration risk had lower rates of 
robbery and aggravated assault, but not homicide. More specifically, a one-unit increase in the 
risk of jail incarceration corresponds to a .3% decrease in the robbery rate, while a one unit 
increase in the risk of jail incarceration corresponds to a .5% decrease in the aggravated assault 
rate. Neither police arrest activity for minor offenses nor police arrest activity for violent 
offenses had an effect on violent crime. Cities with a greater degree of black isolation had higher 
rates of robbery and homicide; however, black isolation did not impact rates of robbery. 
Altogether, the significant predictors in the model accounted for 61 percent of the variation in 
robbery across cities, 5 percent of the variation in aggravated assault, and 17 percent of the 
variation in homicide. 
Next, we turned to the examination of the moderating effects of formal controls on the 
relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and violent crime. Recall from the 
framework above that formal controls are expected to weaken sources of informal control, but 
primarily in neighborhoods where these resources are already depleted (Clear, 2008; Clear et al., 
2003). Accordingly, we examined the moderating effect of formal controls (police arrest activity 
and jail incarceration risk) on the relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and 
violent crime, where extreme neighborhood disadvantage reflects the top 10 percent of the 
neighborhoods within each city based on the neighborhood disadvantage scale. For these 
analyses, we also control for the main effects of neighborhood and city characteristics; the 
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neighborhood-level results are not shown because they were not substantively different from 
those reported in table 2.    
-- Table 3 about here -- 
The relationship between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and each type of violent 
crime varied across cities, permitting the analysis of the moderating effects of formal controls 
(depicted in table 3). The main effects of the city-level characteristics, also presented in table 3, 
show that the city-level main effects were virtually identical to those contained in table 2. The 
one difference was the significant inverse effect of jail incarceration risk on homicide rates 
across cities; cities that used this formal control to a greater extent also had lower rates of 
homicide.  
The analysis of the moderating effects (table 3) showed that the positive relationship 
between extreme neighborhood disadvantage and violent crime (robbery, aggravated assault, and 
homicide) was amplified by police arrest activity for minor offenses. Police arrest activity for 
violent offenses did not impact the extreme neighborhood disadvantage effect on robbery, 
aggravated assault, or homicide. Jail incarceration risk did not moderate the effect of extreme 
neighborhood disadvantage on violent crime.  
Supplementary Analyses 
 The inclusion of jail incarceration risk in the models raises the possibility of simultaneity 
because the risk of jail incarceration may not only deter crime, but also might be simultaneously 
influenced by the crime rate. Such a scenario would contribute to correlated error terms. It is 
unlikely that simultaneity is a problem for our analyses because: a) we focused on disaggregated 
offending rates for specific crimes (e.g., it is unlikely that the homicide rate influences the risk of 
jail incarceration), b) the jail data were collected in advance of the crime data, and c) the jail 
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incarceration risk measures are based on county-level data, whereas the relevant crime data are 
city based (Sampson, 1986). However, to rule out the possibility of simultaneity we adopted a 
similar approach as Sampson (1986) and re-estimated all of the models using jail capacity per 
violent index offenses as an instrument for jail incarceration risk. Jail capacity accounted for 
over 80 percent of the variation in jail incarceration risk. Our analyses revealed no substantive 
differences in the findings (coefficients, standard errors, and statistical significance were 
unchanged), suggesting that simultaneity was not a problem here.     
Discussion and Conclusions 
Informal and formal social controls regulate behavior and control crime within ecological 
areas. While researchers have explored the impacts of informal controls (Kubrin & Weitzer, 
2003; Sampson et al., 1997), less research has examined the impact of formal controls (Kane, 
2006; Lynch & Sabol, 2004a; Sampson, 1986; Western, 2006). Following scholars’ contentions 
that there may be both intended and unintended consequences of formal controls (Clear, 2007; 
Rose & Clear, 1998; Sampson, 1986; Western, 2006), we examined the effects of formal controls 
(police arrest activity and risk of jail incarceration) on violent crime across cities and whether 
their effects were detrimental in neighborhoods characterized by extreme disadvantage. We 
focused on neighborhoods characterized by extreme disadvantage because scholars have argued 
that those communities are most likely to experience the unintended consequences of formal 
controls, such as increased crime levels (e.g., Clear, 2007). Our analyses revealed two main 
findings, which we expand upon below.  
First, consistent with results from existing studies (Kane, 2006; Sampson, 1986; Sampson 
& Cohen, 1988; Wilson & Boland, 1978; Wilson & Kelling, 1982), we found evidence that some 
formal controls do reduce violent crime, while others do not. Cities with a higher risk of jail 
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incarceration experienced lower rates of robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide, but police 
arrest activity was not associated with reduced city violent crime. Furthermore, our findings are 
consistent with others (e.g., Sampson, 1986) who have suggested that the risk of being 
incarcerated in a local jail serves a strong deterrent effect on potential offenders; in the current 
study, we found that the risk of local jail incarceration was indeed associated with lower rates of 
violent crimes. As Sampson (1986) explained, local incarceration is much more visible than 
other types of sanctions (e.g., state imprisonment) and may act as a deterrent due to its more 
immediate threat of punishment. More research is needed to examine the effects of city jail 
incarceration since our findings suggest it is an inhibitor of city crime.  
Second, our results support scholars’ arguments that formal controls have unintended 
consequences (e.g., Clear, 2007, 2008; Rose & Clear, 1998), specifically higher rates of crime, 
for extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods. We found that the relationship between extreme 
neighborhood disadvantage and all types of violent crime was exacerbated by police arrest 
activity of minor offenses. In order to reduce violent crime in extremely disadvantaged 
communities, police officers should practice extra caution utilizing their arrest powers, 
particularly for minor offenses. In these communities, where resources are very scarce and 
informal social controls are already depleted, arresting suspects may cause more harm to the 
community by worsening these problems. It is also possible that police arresting for minor 
offenses in these areas erodes residents’ trust in and perceived legitimacy of the police, which in 
turn, can lead to higher crime and violence (e.g., Kirk & Matseuda, 2011). Our findings suggest 
that police should be aware of the potential for their actions, especially if perceived as 
unnecessary or trivial, to be counterproductive. Furthermore, police arrest practices should focus 
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on the most dangerous suspects in order to reduce violent crime in extremely disadvantaged 
areas. 
Although we were unable to test the impact of formal controls on informal controls 
within neighborhoods (see Lynch & Sabol, 2004a) due to data limitations, our findings suggest 
that police arrest activity is associated with higher violent crime within extremely disadvantaged 
neighborhoods; it could be argued, as Clear and colleagues have theorized, that these results 
indicate that formal controls disrupt the ability of informal controls within these areas to regulate 
criminal behavior. Nonetheless, examining the impact that formal controls may have on 
measures of informal controls would provide additional information regarding the much-needed 
link between formal controls and their effects on neighborhood crime (see Lynch & Sabol, 
2004a). The precise mechanisms linking formal controls to community crime remain under-
examined (Wildeman & Western, 2010), and future research should consider directly testing the 
impact of formal controls on neighborhood informal social control agents and capacities.  
Returning to our earlier point, our results also confirm researchers’ (e.g., Kubrin et al., 
2010) claims that controlling for economic and/or social indicators of cities, as well as 
neighborhood compositional effects, is important when examining the effects of formal controls 
within and across cities. We found that neighborhood disadvantage, residential instability, and 
racial demographic characteristics were significantly associated with violent crime rates, and are 
thus important to include in statistical models when determining the impact of formal controls. 
Additionally, at the city-level, isolation of black residents was associated with higher robbery 
and homicide rates. In all, including such controls in our models rendered the effects of police 
behavior nonsignificant while the effects of jail incarceration remained. The findings also raise 
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questions for future research regarding the interplay between cities’ allocation of formal controls 
and racial segregation across cities.  
The current study has provided an examination of the intended effects of formal controls 
across cities and the potential unanticipated consequences of formal controls for extremely 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Nonetheless, further research on formal controls is still needed in 
order to build upon and address the potential limitations of this current study, particularly 
regarding reciprocal effects of formal controls and crime (e.g., Clear, 2007; Lynch & Sabol, 
2004a) and potential curvilinear relationships between formal controls (police behavior and/or 
incarceration, e.g., Clear et al., 2003; Kane, 2006) and community crime levels. Similarly, it 
might be that the deployment of formal controls at the neighborhood level, as opposed to the 
city-level, impacts neighborhood processes differently. We examined formal controls at the city-
level in the current study, but future examinations may want to consider this as a potential 
research avenue (see Kane, 2005). Finally, as noted, we were unable to examine the effects of 
formal controls on indicators of informal controls, and more research in this area is needed.  
Despite these limitations, this study adds to our understanding of the impact of formal 
controls on violent crime by examining their effects across a large sample of U.S. cities and the 
neighborhoods within them. Consistent with the few studies that have examined the direct effects 
of formal controls, we found that forms of public control can be resources that cities can draw 
upon to regulate and control crime. However, we also uncovered that formal controls can have 
harmful consequences for some neighborhoods within cities. These findings underscore the 
importance of tailoring the application of formal controls to the communities they are serving. 
For most neighborhoods, it seems that incarcerating law violators may complement existing 
sources of informal control and work to reduce crime levels. In contrast, in extremely 
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disadvantaged neighborhoods that are depleted of such resources, applying formal controls, 
particularly police actions, too vigorously may only further diminish the crime-reducing effects 
of informal controls. These unintended consequences of formal controls are important to 
consider, given that crime is disproportionately concentrated in these neighborhoods to begin 
with. Local stakeholders may want to consider alternative responses to crime in these 
neighborhoods, such as those that strengthen, rather than deplete sources of informal control. 
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                    Table 1 Description of sample and measures 
 
      Mean    SD Minimum-Maximum 
Outcomes    
Robbery  1.37 .82      0 - 4.84 
Aggravated assault1  1.69 .85      0 - 4.99 
Homicide2  1.52 2.52   0 - 33 
Neighborhood-level variables    
Neighborhood disadvantage .00 1.00 -1.69 - 4.11 
  Extreme neighborhood disadvantage .10 .29  0 - 1 
Concentrated immigration .00 1.00 -4.50 - 4.17 
Residential instability .00 1.00 -3.28 - 4.22 
Percent black 25.84 32.81      0 - 100 
Percent Asian 4.46 7.29         0 - 92.89 
N1 =  9,560   
City-level variables    
Police arrest activity    
  Minor offenses 3.37 2.43      .08 - 15.21 
  Violent offenses 1.44 1.02    .10 - 6.74 
Jail incarceration risk 42.74 23.08    10.08 - 146.35 
Gini index of inequality .45 .05           .36 - .58 
Black isolation 34.85 26.83      .75 - 90.26 
N2 =  90   
               Notes: 1 Based on 8,580 neighborhoods; 2 Based on 8,979 neighborhoods 
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  Table 2 Neighborhood and city-level effects on violent crime 
 
 Robbery Aggravated Assault Homicide 
     Coef.  (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef.  (SE) 
Intercept 1.34 (.03) 1.66 (.05) -.18 (.05) 
Neighborhood-level       
Neighborhood disadvantage .45** (.03) .58** (.03)   .63** (.03) 
Concentrated immigration .12** (.04) -.01 (.03) .18** (.03) 
Residential instability .12** (.01) .11** (.01) .05** (.01) 
Percent black  .01** (.001) .01** (.001) .02** (.001) 
Percent Asian -.01** (.002) -.01** (.003) -.01** (.003) 
Proportion of variation within cities .64  .69  .84  
Proportion of variation within cities explained .46  .67  .39  
N1       9,560     8,580   8,979  
City-level       
Police arrest activity       
  Minor offenses -.001 (.01) -.01 (.01) .02 (.02) 
  Violent offenses .02 (.01) -.002 (.03) -.03 (.03) 
Jail incarceration risk -.003** (.001) -.005** (.001) -.003   (.002) 
Gini index of inequality .92 (.55) .02 (.83) 1.42 (1.12) 
Black isolation .01** (.001) .002 (.001)    .01** (.001) 
Proportion of variation between cities .36  .31  .16  
Proportion of variation between cities explained .61  .05  .17  
N          90        78         88  
   Notes: Hierarchical linear models predicting robbery and aggravated assault, hierarchical Poisson model predicting  
   homicide.   
     ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
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            Table 3 Main and moderating effects of city-level formal controls on violent crime  
 
 Robbery Aggravated Assault Homicide 
 β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) 
Level-1 intercept as outcome 1.15 (.02) 1.44 (.05) -.20 (.06) 
Police arrest activity       
  Minor offenses    .004 (.01) -.01 (.01) .01 (.02) 
  Violent offenses    .04 (.03) .01 (.06) .07 (.07) 
Jail incarceration risk  -.004** (.001) -.01* (.002)     -.01** (.002) 
Gini index of inequality 1.22* (.60) -.04 (1.12) 1.51 (1.22) 
Black isolation    .01** (.001) .001 (.002) .01** (.003) 
Proportion of variation between cities    .36  .31  .16  
Proportion of variation between cities explained    .66  .13  .13  
       
Level-1 extreme neighborhood disadvantage effect as outcome    .27** (.03) .31* (.03) .62** (.04) 
x Police activity       
    Minor offenses    .02* (.01) .03* (.01) .06** (.02) 
    Violent offenses  -.01 (.03) -.01 (.03) .04 (.02) 
x Jail incarceration risk    .001 (.001)    .002 (.001)     .001 (.002) 
N2    90      78        88  
             Notes: Hierarchical linear models predicting robbery and aggravated assault, hierarchical Poisson model predicting homicide.  
                     ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
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1 Some scholars have focused on the consequences of formal controls (primarily imprisonment) for particular social 
groups (e.g., Clear, 2007; Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2004; Rose & Clear, 1998; Western, 2006; Wakefield & 
Wildeman, 2011) and have uncovered unintended consequences associated with the use of formal controls (e.g., 
furthered marginalization) for particular groups of people (e.g., lower class blacks). Our study, in contrast, focuses 
on community crime levels. 
2 Throughout this manuscript, we focus on community level crime rates and therefore do not review the extensive 
literature on police effects on crime at the micro-level (e.g., Eck & MacGuire, 2000). 
3 Jails typically serve an entire county; however, in large metropolitan areas such as those examined here, the city 
and the county are, from a practical standpoint, one and the same (Sampson, 1986). 
4 Although some scholars recognize potential harmful effects to community and familial systems when offenders are 
removed from their neighborhoods, others explain the benefits of offender removal. For example, Wakefield and 
Wildeman (2011) discuss the improvement in a child’s wellbeing when the father is arrested and incarcerated for a 
sexual or violent offense. 
5 Census tracts have been frequently used to approximate local “neighborhood” context (Kohfeld & Sprague, 1988; 
Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Krivo, Peterson, & Kuhl, 2009; McClain, 1989).   
6 The NNCS reported 10.2% of the neighborhoods were missing aggravated assault data and 6.1% of the 
neighborhoods were missing homicide data.  
7 As types of violent crime, we expect that formal controls will be inversely related to these outcomes, but because 
each may involve different means and motives, we also expect that the impact of formal controls might vary across 
the crime types (Sampson, 1986); thus, we modeled each as a separate outcome. 
8 Percent of population receiving public assistance was not available in the NNCS and was retrieved from American 
Fact Finder. 
9 Kane (2006) excluded rape offenses from his measure of enforcement vigor, while the current study uses all 
violent offenses as the numerator. We performed the analyses that are subsequently described with the variable 
measured both ways. No substantive differences in the results emerged. 
10 Arrest data were missing for 15 of the 91 cities in the sample. In these cases, police departments were directly 
contacted, with a response rate of 93 percent. One city (Topeka, KS) was unable to provide arrest data due to a 
change in computer operating systems and was subsequently dropped from the sample. Washington, D.C. arrest data 
were retrieved from the Metropolitan Police Department 2000 Annual Report. Louisville, KY, Memphis, TN, and 
Seattle, WA arrest data are from year 2001. Florida cities did not report the number of arrests for disorderly conduct; 
these offenses were included in an “other” offenses category and therefore were estimated using a five-step process. 
First, we added the number of disorderly conduct arrests to the number of arrests for “other” offenses in all other 
cities in the sample. Next, we computed the percentage of arrests for “other” offenses that were for disorderly 
conduct in these cities. Third, we stratified all of the cities into four groups based on city population size. Fourth, we 
computed the average percentage of arrests for “other” offenses that were for disorderly conduct within each 
stratum. Finally, we used the within stratum average percentage of arrests for “other” offenses that were for 
disorderly conduct to derive estimates of each Florida city’s number of disorderly conduct arrests from their 
respective number of arrests for “other” offenses. 
11 Larimer County, Colorado jail data were retrieved from the 1999 National Jail Census.  
12 The Gini index of household income inequality , where Xi is the cumulative 
proportion of households in income category i; Yi is the cumulative proportion of household income in income 
category i; and n is the number of income categories. The black isolation index , where bj is 
the number of black residents in tract j; tj is the total population in tract j; n is the number of tracts in the city; and B 
is the total number of black residents in the city. 
13 In order to avoid a misspecification error, owing to differences in incarceration practices across states (see, e.g., 
Sampson, 1986), we initially estimated tri-level unconditional models (neighborhoods within cities within states). 
These models revealed nonsignificant variation across states, which supported the estimation of the bi-level models 
reported here.   
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14 Our main findings are at the city level, which are not spatially contiguous. Therefore, analyses taking into account 
spatial autocorrelation were not necessary.  
